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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  paper  aims  to analyze  the  impact  of auditor  tenure  on audit  quality.  The  research  is  motivated  by
the  absence  of  consensus  in published  works,  and  by the scarcity  of  studies  carried out  on  non-proﬁt
organizations.  Using  a sample  of 254  audits  carried  out  between  2003  and  2010  on Spanish  state-owned
foundations,  we  ﬁnd  that,  although  foundation  audit  quality  decreases  as  tenure  length increases,  this
quality  loss does  not  become  apparent  until  the sixth  year  of  the  foundation–auditor  relationship,  after
an initial  ﬁve  years  of  improvement  in quality.  The  empirical  evidence  is important  for  regulators  and
ﬁnancial  statement  users,  given  that  it suggests  the  need  for the  introduction  of  tenure-reducing  measures
which,  at  the  same  time,  also  ensure  a minimum  tenure  period.
© 2013  ASEPUC.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Permanencia  del  auditor  y  calidad  de  la  auditoría  en  las  fundaciones  públicas
estatales
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Este  trabajo  analiza  el impacto  de la  permanencia  del  auditor  sobre  la  calidad  de  la  auditoría  en las
entidades  no lucrativas.  Esta  investigación  está motivada  por  la  ausencia  de  consenso  en  la literatura  sobre
esta cuestión  y  la  escasez  de  estudios  realizados  en  el sector  de  las  entidades  no  lucrativas.  Utilizando
una  muestra  de  254  auditorías  llevadas  a  cabo  para  el  período  2003–2010  sobre  fundaciones  públicas
estatales,  observamos  que,  si  bien  la  calidad  de  la auditoría  de  las  fundaciones  disminuye  a  medida  quealabras clave:
ermanencia del auditor
alidad de la auditoría
ntidades no lucrativas
undaciones
egresión logística
la permanencia  del  auditor  aumenta,  esta  pérdida  de  calidad  no  se maniﬁesta  hasta  el sexto  an˜o  de  la
relación fundación–auditor,  ya  que en  los cinco  primeros  an˜os la  calidad  aumenta.  La evidencia  empírica
de esta  relación  tiene  importantes  implicaciones  para  los legisladores  y  los  usuarios  ya  que  sugiere la
necesidad  de  introducir  medidas  que  limiten  la  duración  de  la  misma  y, al  mismo  tiempo,  aseguren  una
duración  mínima.
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. Introduction
Over the last few decades the relationship between auditor
enure and audit quality has been constantly debated. Even when
rior research has been widespread and not completely deﬁni-
ive (Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007, 113), most of it has involved
n the for-proﬁt sector, speciﬁcally publicly traded corporations.
owever, there has been little research done into the effect of the
uditor on audit quality in non-proﬁt organizations and that which
as been done, as will be shown in the following section, has come
ut of research into other matters.
This study provides fresh empirical evidence which adds to the
ebate as it examines the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality
n a single sector – non-proﬁt making – where there is hardly any
mpirical evidence about this relationship.
This analysis is particularly relevant at the present time since
overnments are being forced by the economic recession to re-
tructure and rationalize a public sector which has ballooned over
he last few decades with the creation of non-proﬁt organizations
o undertake certain public functions (Lohmann, 2007). Such orga-
izations must convince the general public that their policies and
ystems are the right ones to guarantee appropriate management
f the resources provided by taxpayers for them to carry out the
ctivities for which they were set up (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, &
eating, 2007).
An audit is an instrument which inspires conﬁdence in both
xternal users of ﬁnancial data concerning these organizations
beneﬁciaries, public bodies, donors) and internal users – mainly
nancial directors (Bellostas, Brusca, & Moneva, 2006). This is espe-
ially true when the audit opinion is unqualiﬁed.
The kind of audit opinion given not only suggests that the orga-
ization is complying with accounting regulations and is concerned
bout its ﬁnancial management; it also becomes a major factor in
dentifying or preventing fraudulent activity (Bell & Zimmerman,
007).
Audit report opinions are, nevertheless, affected by differ-
nt factors which have been dealt with in a number of papers
González-Díaz, García, & López, 2013; Gosman, 1973; Ireland,
003; Keasey, Watson, & Wynarczyk, 1988; Krishnan, Krishnan, &
tephens, 1996). One factor is auditor tenure.
The aim of this paper is to analyze how tenure affects audit qual-
ty in foundations. Quality is deﬁned from the viewpoint of external
sers of the ﬁnancial statements as the likelihood that an auditor
ill submit a qualiﬁed opinion. A sample of 254 audits carried out
etween 2003 and 2010 was used, representing 46 different foun-
ations. Several logistic regression models were calculated to mea-
ure in different ways the effect of auditor tenure on audit quality.
The results show that, although audit quality diminishes as the
eriod of auditor tenure increases, this loss of quality does not
ecome apparent until the sixth year of the foundation–auditor
elationship. In fact it improves over the ﬁrst ﬁve years. The empir-
cal evidence of this relationship is important for public auditing
iven that it highlights the need for the introduction of tenure-
educing measures which, at the same time, also ensure a minimum
enure period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The ﬁrst sec-
ion reviews relevant literature regarding audit quality and auditor
enure. The second section explains regulations concerning foun-
ation audits and the hypothesis behind the research. The third
ection outlines the study’s methodology. Results follow in the
ourth section and, ﬁnally, conclusions.. Prior research
DeAngelo (1981) deﬁnes audit quality as the probability of an
uditor discovering errors in a client’s ﬁnances and then bringingnish Accounting Review 18 (2) (2015) 115–126
these errors to light in the audit report. Audit quality, therefore,
depends on auditor competence and independence.
Competence is associated with an auditor’s professional skills
and independence may  be real (the auditor’s unbiased or objec-
tive attitude), or just appear to be so (different user perception
of independence). Some literature on the subject of audit quality
considers that the auditor is able to separate both features, while
other authors assume them to be linked. Thus, if an auditor is
competent, the more likely they are to be independent (Richard,
2006).
Given that it is difﬁcult to come up with a proxy which can
assess both auditor competence and independence at the same
time (Vanstraelen, 2000, 420), and that the cost of measuring
the quality of the auditor’s work is highly signiﬁcant, consumers
develop subrogates for audit quality (proxies) which may  be corre-
lated to quality (DeAngelo, 1981). Carcello, Hermanson, and Huss
(1995) point out some of these which have been used by other
authors: litigation against law ﬁrms, auditor selection, auditor
changes and ﬁrm size, nature of auditors’ opinions, pricing of audit
services and user perception.
Also, over the last few decades researchers have analyzed deter-
mining factors in audit quality as well as the effect of auditor tenure
on quality, with a number of studies devoted principally to the lat-
ter and undertaken in the private sector – Table 1 summarizes some
of the works published in this regard.
Specialized literature on the subject has pointed out the lack
of consensus concerning the audit quality–auditor tenure relation
(Vanstraelen, 2000) because auditor tenure can have a positive or
negative impact on the two main determinants of audit quality:
auditor competence and auditor independence.
Geiger and Raghunandan (2002), Myers, Myers, and Omer
(2003), Ghosh and Moon (2005), Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007)
and Jackson, Moldrich, and Roebuck (2008) have shown that audit
quality improves with auditor tenure. However, Levinthal and
Fichman (1988) and Deis and Giroux (1992) show just the opposite.
By measuring tenure as the number of years an auditor has audited
a company, these studies consider the audit quality–auditor tenure
relation to be linear.
Ruiz, Gómez, and Carrera (2006) suggest that divergences from
an empirical point of view may  be due to the fact that audit qual-
ity does not vary in a linear way  over the duration of the contract
and that it may  change depending on the duration of client/auditor
relationship.
Long auditor tenure may  increase competence because the audi-
tor’s client-speciﬁc knowledge increases over the years (St. Pierre
and Anderson, 1984). This will allow them to improve the quality of
their auditing but it could also reduce their degree of independence
in the sense that a long auditor–client relationship may make the
auditor ﬁnancially reliant on the client (Ruiz et al., 2006) and bring
about such a close relationship (Whittington, Grout, & Jewitt, 1995)
that unbiased assessment is compromised (Shockley, 1981) by lack
of both innovation and procedural rigour (Schockley, 1982).
Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) claim that speciﬁc client
knowledge gained over the years could entail a reduction in auditor
effort, yet this does not necessarily involve a threat to the quality
of the work.
Short auditor tenure could negatively affect competence
because auditors’ client knowledge is less over the ﬁrst few years
and they need time to get used to their clients’ activity and account-
ing procedures (Carcello & Nagy, 2004). Their independence could
also be compromised since they need to keep new clients in order
to recover their initial client-speciﬁc investment, which cannot be
transferred to other contracts (Ruiz et al., 2006).
Industry specialization, however, can improve both competence
and independence, leading to higher audit quality since auditors
know their sector far better than non-specialist ﬁrms and can audit
B. González-Díaz et al. / Revista de Contabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 18 (2) (2015) 115–126 117
Table  1
Empirical evidence on the relationship between audit quality and auditor tenure.
Author/s Sample Period Proxy Results
Audit quality Auditor tenure
Carcello and Nagy
(2004)
208 companies 1990–2001 Fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting ≥9 years
≤3 years
Ns
−
Carey and Simnett
(2006)
1021 Public companies listed
on the Australian Stock
Exchange
1995 Issuing a going-concern audit
opinion
>7 years
≤2 years
−
Ns
Abnormal working capital
accruals
>7 years
≤2 years
Ns
Ns
Extent of earnings
management: just misses
breakeven
>7 years
≤2 years
−
−
Extent of earnings
management: just beats
breakeven
>7 years
≤2 years
Ns
Ns
Deis and Giroux
(1992)
232 Quality Control Review
(QCRs) on CPA audits of Texas
Independent School District
(ISD)
1983–1988 Natural log of the weighted
quality metric based on the
QCRs letters of ﬁndings
Number of years
the auditor has
audited the ISD
−
Geiger and
Raghunandan
(2002)
117 Public company
bankruptcies
1996–1998 Issuing a going-concern audit
opinion prior to bankruptcy
Natural log of
auditor tenure
in years
+
Ghosh and Moon
(2005)
Traded ﬁrms (35,826
ﬁrm-years)
1990–2000 Earnings response coefﬁcients
(ERCs)
Duration of the
auditor–client
relationship in
years
+
Jackson et al. (2008) 1750 ﬁrms 1995–2003 Issuing a going-concern audit
opinion
Length of the
auditor–client
relationship
in years
+
Discretionary accruals Length of the
auditor–client
relationship in
years
Ns
Johnson et al. (2002) US corporations (11,148
ﬁrm-year observations)
1986–1995 Absolute value of unexpected
accruals
≥9 years
2–3 years
Ns
+
The persistence of the accrual
components of earnings
≥9 years
2–3 years
Ns
+
Knechel and
Vanstraelen (2007)
309 private Belgian companies
bankruptcies
1992–1996 Issuing a going-concern
audit opinion
Duration of the
auditor–client
relationship in
years
Ns
>3 years Ns
309  private Belgian companies
non-bankruptcies
1992–1996 Issuing a going-concern
audit opinion
Duration of the
auditor–client
relationship in
years
Ns
>3 years −
Krishnan and
Shauer (2000)
164 voluntary health
and welfare organizations
N.a. The entity’s compliance with
eight GAAP reporting
requirements
≥3 years Ns
Levinthal and
Fichman (1988)
1884 ﬁrms 1983 Issuing a qualiﬁed audit
opinion
The number of
years from the
beginning of an
auditor–client
relationship to its
ending
−
Lim and Tan (2010) Non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms audited
by Big N auditors (12,786
ﬁrm-years)
2000–2005 Modiﬁed accrual quality
measure by McNichols
2002
Median tenure in
the sample
−
≥9 years
≤3 years
Ns
+
Lowensohn et al.
(2007)
241 surveys to ﬁnance ofﬁcials
from counties, local
municipalities and special
districts within the State
of Florida
Audits for the
ﬁscal year
ending
September 30,
2002
Perceived quality of audit Natural logarithm
of the audit ﬁrm’s
tenure as the
government’s
auditor
+
Myers et al. (2003) All ﬁrms-years with sufﬁcient
data on the 2001 Compustat
annual industrial
(42,302 ﬁrm-years
1988–2000 Accounting accruals The number of
consecutive years
that the ﬁrm has
retained the
auditor
+
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Table  1 (Continued)
Author/s Sample Period Proxy Results
Audit quality Auditor tenure
Monterrey and
Sánchez-Segura
(2007)
136 non-ﬁnancial companies
listed on the Spanish Stock
Exchange (396 ﬁrm-years)
2003–2005 Accounting accruals ≥5 years +
Ruiz et al. (2006) 377 companies listed on the
Spanish Stock Exchange
1990–2000 Issuing a going-concern audit
opinion
≥8 years
≤3 years
Ns
+
Vanstraelen (2000) 796 ﬁnancially companies 1992–1996 Issuing a qualiﬁed audit
opinion
Length of the
auditor–client
relationship
in years
−
N
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ew clients more easily. Also, the higher a ﬁrm’s reputation in its
ector, the more independence it seems to have (Lim & Tan, 2010).
Vanstraelen (2000), Johnson et al. (2002), Carcello and Nagy
2004), Carey and Simnett (2006), Ruiz et al. (2006), and Monterrey
nd Sánchez-Segura (2007) acknowledge the non-linear nature of
he relation by attempting to show that the duration of an auditor’s
ontract can inﬂuence audit quality.
Vanstraelen (2000) in particular points out that auditor perfor-
ance is different in the ﬁrst two and in the ﬁnal years of tenure. She
laims that the likelihood of issuing a qualiﬁed opinion is greater in
he ﬁnal year than in the ﬁrst two because the auditor knows that
heir contract will not be renewed and that the current audit will
e the last.
Johnson et al. (2002), looking at a context in which auditor rota-
ion is not compulsory, provide evidence that ﬁnancial reporting
uality is associated with short audit-ﬁrm tenures. Ruiz et al. (2006)
onﬁrm the fact that audit quality grows over the ﬁrst few years
ut then does not drop away in long tenures. Carcello and Nagy
2004, 55) point out that “fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting is more
ikely to occur in the ﬁrst three years of the auditor–client rela-
ionship” although they fail to show that this happens with longer
enures.
Monterrey and Sánchez-Segura (2007) show that when the
uditor–client relationship has lasted over 5 years the beneﬁts of
uch familiarity become obvious, as the auditor has got to know
he client well. The study suggests that rotation regulations should
e aimed at ensuring long tenure, as constant changes do not bring
bout greater accounting quality.
On the other hand, Carey and Simnett (2006, 674) claim that
he longer the audit partner tenure the lower the quality of the
udit, when quality is measured in terms of the auditor’s propensity
o issue a going-concern audit opinion and just meeting (missing)
arnings benchmarks.
By analyzing these previous studies it is clear that their empiri-
al results are not conclusive. Ewelt-Knauer, Gold, and Pott (2012,
013, 35) suggest that the positive or negative effects of the
lient/auditor association depend on what research method is used
s well as the proxy chosen to measure audit quality. They also
oint out that, by analyzing stakeholders, “regulators take a stance
n favour of rotation, arguing that rotation provides an opportunity to
vercome problems caused by (excessive) tenure. At the other extreme,
udit ﬁrms are critical and point to a loss of knowledge and expertise
otentially caused by rotation. The views of audit clients and share-
olders overall appear to be relatively mixed”.
The audit quality–auditor tenure relation has barely been
esearched in the public and non-proﬁt sectors. In the public sec-
or Deis and Giroux (1992) look at what determines audit quality
n independent school districts in Texas and Lowensohn, Johnson,
lder, and Davies (2007) study the relation between audit qual-
ty perceived by 241 Florida local government ﬁnance directorsand certain audit/auditor attributes. The results of these studies
are contradictory with the quality–tenure results being negative in
the former and positive in the latter.
In the non-proﬁt sector Krishnan and Shauer (2000) examine
the relation between quality auditing and auditor tenure, although
the main aim of their study is the relation between auditor size
and the audit quality of 164 voluntary health and welfare organi-
zations in south-eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey.
Their results show zero impact on audit quality.
Other works concerning the non-proﬁt sector include a study of
auditor tenure being a determining factor, not in audit quality but
in audit-ﬁrm fees (Ellis & Booker, 2011; Vermeer, Raghunandan,
& Forgione, 2009) or information on internal control weaknesses
(López & Peters, 2010). In this context, the aim of this study is to
provide evidence from the non-proﬁt sector that may  assist the
debate about whether or not to establish tenure limits.
3. Auditing of state-owned foundations
Foundations are organizations which collaborate with the state
in order to achieve aims of general interest (IGAE, 2010). To be
of general interest, one or both of the following pre-requisites are
necessary:
• They should be created through a direct or indirect majority
contribution from the General State Administration, its public
organisms or other entities belonging to the public sector.
• More than 50 percent of their ﬁxed assets should comprise goods
or rights which have been provided by or transferred from the
above-mentioned public entities.
External audits of these organizations are regulated by the Law
50/2002 on Foundations, which came into effect on 1 January 2003,
and by the Royal Decree 1337/2005, which encompasses regula-
tions referring to state-owned foundations. The General Budgetary
Act (GBA) 47/2003 also includes regulations governing foundations.
The Foundations Act designates the “Intervención General del
Estado” (IGAE) (General State Comptroller) as the auditor of foun-
dations. The IGAE is required to audit these organizations over two
consecutive years when at least 2 of the following situations arise
2 years in a row:
• Assets amount to over 2,400,000 Euros.
• Annual revenues amount to over 2,400,000 Euros.
• The foundation has over 50 employees.Establishing a minimum related to assets, state subsidies,
income and costs or the number of employees is a general criterion
applied in most countries to decide whether or not a non-proﬁt
organization should be audited or not (Kitching, 2009; Tate, 2007).
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t is unusual for compulsory audits to be determined solely accord-
ng to the nature of the foundation (EFC, 2011).
Foundations which come into the IGAE compulsory-audit cat-
gory are considered large. Small and medium-sized foundations
re not all legally required to be audited and yet some voluntarily
equest private ﬁrm audit.
Up until now types of foundation auditors have been analyzed,
ut not the length of time their relationship lasts. The IGAE is
equired to carry out annual external audits on large foundations,
hich entails the public auditor having an indeﬁnite relationship
ith the foundation unless it either ceases to exist or is no longer
onsidered “large”. As far as private auditors are concerned, Span-
sh audit law states that, when audits are compulsory, private
uditors cannot be contracted by any single organization for less
han three years or more than nine. When audits are voluntary,
owever, as is the case in this study, these restrictions are not
pplied, which means that a foundation that chooses to be audited
nnually can maintain an indeﬁnite relationship with an auditor.
t is, therefore, an environment without mandatory auditor rota-
ion.
The “Tribunal de Cuentas”, as the supreme auditing and ﬁnancial
anagement body of the Spanish state and of the public sector, may
ndertake control activity in state-owned foundations. Since its
eginnings in 1982, it has been involved in scrutinizing and check-
ng public accounts, including the state foundation sector, where
xternal audits carried out by the IGAE ﬁgure prominently.
Also, the “Tribunal de Cuentas” annual programme may  include
oundation auditing. Between 2003 and 2010 this institution issued
 reports on the auditing of state-owned foundations. The reports
eal with a variety of auditing objectives, from ﬁnancial and
egal audits to management efﬁciency and compliance with hiring
equirements.
The scarcity of academic studies on the non-proﬁt sec-
or prevents us from reaching any ﬁrm conclusions about the
udit quality–auditor tenure relation. However, diverse empirical
vidence in the private sector, plus the legal framework for foun-
ations in Spain, leads us to the following hypothesis.
ypothesis. There is an association between audit quality and
uditor tenure.
. Data and methodology
.1. Sample selection
The main data analyzed in this study was obtained from
he Inventory of State/Public Sector Organizations (INVESPE) – the
ain source and a software application which has been prepared
nd updated by the IGAE – as well as the Declaration of the Gen-
ral Statement of State Accounts, and the ﬁnancial reports on state
oundations from 2003 to 2010. The study started in 2003, when
he Foundations Law (which establishes who exactly should audit
oundations) came into effect. It concluded in 2010, the year with
he latest available data. Prior to the Foundations Law, Spanish
egislation did not specify either who should audit foundations or
hich ﬁnancial reporting regulations should be applied (González,
arcía, & López, 2011).
Of the 256 audits carried out over this period, 2 have been
xcluded as one of them contains an adverse opinion and the other
s a disclaimer. The ﬁnal dataset used for this study includes 254
udits with positive or qualiﬁed opinions..2. Methodology
The effect of auditor tenure on audit quality in foundations was
xamined via the estimation of logistic regression models in whichnish Accounting Review 18 (2) (2015) 115–126 119
audit quality (audqual) is the dependent variable. The indepen-
dent variable is auditor tenure (aud tenure) and control variables
are: type of auditor (auditor), size (size), previous year’s opinion
(prev year's opin), the foundations’ revenue exceeds its expenses
(surplus), the sector (department) and the year (year).
4.2.1. Dependent variable
Audqual is a dummy  variable which takes the values 1 and 0
depending on whether the report is qualiﬁed (1) or unqualiﬁed (0).
Most of the studies which were examined use only one proxy
to measure audit quality, except Johnson et al. (2002) and Jackson
et al. (2008), which use two, and Carey and Simnett (2006) which
uses four.
In this study audit quality has been measured from the point
of view of external users of ﬁnancial statements as the likelihood
that an auditor will issue a qualiﬁed opinion – the proxy used
by Levinthal and Fichman (1988) and Vanstraelen (2000). When
an auditor issues an unclean audit report it means they are able
to objectively assess business results and resist client pressure
to issue a clean opinion (DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam,
2002, 1248–1249). This suggests that there is a positive correlation
between the issuing of a qualiﬁed opinion and the level of auditor
competence and independence.
Moreover, this proxy was  chosen due to the fact that access
to ﬁnancial information from these organizations is very difﬁcult
given that they fail to comply with article 136 of the General Bud-
getary Act which requires their annual accounts to be published in
the Ofﬁcial Gazette. Moreover, not all of those who have published
their annual accounts in the Gazette have included the audit report,
a key document for identifying and classifying qualiﬁed opinions
that can be used as audit quality proxies. It is hoped, nevertheless,
that the new Law, 19/2013 on transparency, information access
and good government, which requires foundations to publish their
annual accounts and audit reports, will reinforce their commitment
to publish in the Gazette.
4.2.2. Independent variable
Tenure is measured in two  ways: as a continuous or as a dummy
variable. In the former case, tenure is calculated as the number
of consecutive years a foundation has been audited by the same
auditor (Ellis & Booker, 2011; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Ghosh
& Moon, 2005; Gul, Jaggi, & Krishnan, 2007; Lowensohn et al., 2007;
Myers et al., 2003). The year 1999 was  chosen as the starting point
because the foundations ﬁnancial reports became available then.
Using this proxy entails regarding the audit quality–auditor tenure
relation as linear; in other words, the longer the tenure the greater
or lesser the audit quality.
For the dummy  variable three measurements, obtained by cal-
culating tenure quartiles (Q1 = 2; Q2 = 4; Q3 = 6) for every sample,
were used. The three measurements, therefore, are deﬁned as
tenure ≤ 2 years, tenure ≤ 4 years and tenure ≥ 6 years.
It is usual to bear in mind the regulations each country has con-
cerning the length of auditor tenure in order to deﬁne the tenure
variable when audit quality does not vary in a linear way  for the
duration of the contract. In this sense, the United States and some
EU countries regulate tenure (Vanstraelen, 2000) by setting min-
imum and maximum periods, which some studies have used as
a reference for deﬁning short, medium and long tenure (Carcello
& Nagy, 2004; Gunny et al., 2007; Ruiz et al., 2006), or simply as
a means of specifying minimum tenure, at the end of which the
client and auditor may put an end to their relationship (Knechel &
Vanstraelen, 2007).The study has been unable to consider current tenure legislation
in Spain because, as was pointed out, there is no upper or lower
tenure limit for auditors of state foundations. The criteria used to
deﬁne dummy  variables was to categorize the continuous tenure
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ariable as a dummy  variable, according to the limits established by
he quartiles as proposed by Miján (2002, 392) in order to detect
he independent effects that may  exist at each level and, at the
ame time, bear in mind observation allocation. Lim and Tan (2010),
hen categorizing auditor tenure, use percentiles as the median
nd Fitzgerald, Thompson, and Omer (2012) classify auditor tenure
nto short (1–2 years), medium (3–5 years), and long (6 or more
ears).
.2.3. Control variables
The control variables are those which have been identiﬁed in
revious studies as being possible determining factors in quality
udits: auditor, size, opinion from the previous year’s report, sur-
lus, sector and year.
External audits of the foundations are carried out by private
uditors or by the IGAE, depending on certain conditions. There
s a dummy  variable (auditor) which takes a value of 1 when the
uditors are private and 0 when it is the IGAE. There are also differ-
nces of opinion concerning the inﬂuence of auditor type on audit
uality. Johnson et al. (2002), Ruiz et al. (2006) and Lim and Tan
2010) do not factor in audit type when analysing tenure inﬂu-
nce on quality. Yet the research of Vanstraelen (2000), Knechel
nd Vanstraelen (2007) and Monterrey and Sánchez-Segura (2007)
oes study its impact whilst making a distinction between the “Big
” audit ﬁrms and the rest. The results are by no means uniform;
anstraelen (2000) and Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) ﬁnd no
mpirical evidence that auditor type affects quality; Monterrey and
ánchez-Segura (2007), however, conclude that quality improves
f the auditor is a large ﬁrm and its tenure is less than ﬁve years.
This research explores the effect of auditor type on audit quality
n a context where auditor type depends on the size of the audited
rganization, distinguishing between public and private types of
uditor rather than between large ﬁrms and the rest.
In this sense, existing literature points out relevant differences
etween public and private auditors. Jakubowski (1995) carried out
 study which attempted to ascertain whether the type of auditor
 public or private – might or might not affect the number of con-
rol weaknesses detected in local governments. The study revealed
hat state auditors discovered more weaknesses than did private
rms. The author considers that state and private auditors view the
udit process differently. Whereas the former are under no pres-
ure from their clients (taxpayers), the latter may  lose clients (local
overnments) if the number of qualiﬁcations published is partic-
larly high. This would help to explain why state auditors report
ore weaknesses than both large and small private ﬁrms.
In a report commissioned by the GAO (Government
ccountability Ofﬁce, 2007) the President’s Council on Integrity
nd Efﬁciency reviewed a sample of 208 audits undertaken by
tate and private auditors on relevant state and local governments
nd non-proﬁt organizations in 2003. The report concluded that an
udit was unacceptable when deﬁciencies were “so serious that
he auditors’ opinion on at least one major programme cannot
e relied upon; e.g. no evidence of internal control testing and
ompliance testing for all or most compliance requirements for
ne or more major programmes, unreported audit ﬁndings, and
t least one incorrectly identiﬁed major program” – 30.29 percent
f the audits reviewed were thus rated and all of these had been
onducted by private auditors.
This result may  be explained by Jakubowski’s thesis, but it
ould also be true that private auditors fail to devote enough
esources for detecting weaknesses in internal control systems in
hese organizations. In fact, López and Peters (2010) obtained a
esult which changed the empirical evidence of previous studies.
hey researched the relationship between opinion type and auditor
ype by looking at a sample of audit reports pertaining to a set of US
ities and counties over the period 2004–2006. They reached thenish Accounting Review 18 (2) (2015) 115–126
conclusion that the likelihood of detecting internal control issues
increases if the auditors are private. They argue that, in the USA,
private ﬁrms boosted resources for assessing internal control in
the audits they carried out.
On the other hand, Dehkordi and Makarem’s study (2011)
published a year after the one by López and Peters and which
examines the effects of auditor type and size on audit quality
in Iran, concludes that ﬁnancial statements audited by the pub-
lic “Audit Organization” contain fewer discretionary accruals than
statements audited by private ﬁrms. This suggests that when the
public auditor does the audit the quality is higher. Bearing in
mind that, with the exception of the López and Peters’ study
in 2010, all other work is unanimous, it is to be expected that
the sign of the dependent variable-type of auditor relation will be
positive.
Size is deﬁned as the natural log of total assets (size). Some stud-
ies show that the bigger an organization, the lower the audit quality,
since the complexity of its operations demands speciﬁc auditor
knowledge (Krishnan & Shauer, 2000; O’Keefe, King, & Gaver, 1994).
Therefore, a positive sign is predicted.
Previous year’s opinion (prev year's opin) is deﬁned as a dummy
variable which takes the value of 1 when the opinion in the pre-
vious year’s report was  qualiﬁed and 0 in the opposite case. This
variable has been included in the study since there is empirical
proof that shows that the same audit opinion is repeated over time,
increasing the probability of receiving a qualiﬁed opinion if the
previous year’s opinion was also qualiﬁed (Ireland, 2003; Keasey
et al., 1988).
The audit ﬁrm may  have an incentive to repeatedly qualify
audit reports if, having qualiﬁed the ﬁrst one, the company has
not decided whether its services will still be required (Ireland,
2003). Also, the type of qualiﬁcation may cause the qualiﬁed opin-
ion to be maintained over several years since a company that
receives a qualiﬁed opinion brought about by uncertainty the pre-
vious year is very likely to get the same opinion in the current
year given that uncertainty may  extend beyond one year (González
et al., 2011; Monroe & Teh, 1993). Therefore, a positive sign is
predicted.
This study also includes an indicator of whether the founda-
tion’s revenues exceed its expenses (surplus). This is expressed as
a dummy  variable with a value of 1 when its income is less than
its running costs (losses) and 0 in the opposite case. It is deﬁned
as a dummy  rather than a continuous variable based on work car-
ried out by other authors concerning the non-proﬁt sector (Keating,
Fischer, Gordon, & Greenlee, 2005; Petrovits, Shakespeare, & Shih,
2011).
Non-proﬁt organizations may  have incentives to minimize
their proﬁts. On the one hand, donors and regulating bodies may
get the impression that proﬁt contradicts the fundamental pur-
pose of the organization (Trussel, 2003). A study carried out by
Calabrese (2011) shows that future contributions of donors are
negatively affected when wealth levels are deemed excessive; on
the other hand, as proﬁt should be reinvested in the organization
and not shared out among partners and employees, it is possible
that certain illicit practices such as unwarranted expense claims
could take place (Greenlee et al., 2007). It is to be expected that
the coefﬁcient sign related to the surplus variable will be posi-
tive.
The variable concerning the relationship with particular gov-
ernment departments (department) is also a dummy one and takes
the value of 1 when the foundation belongs to the Tax and Finance
Department, and 0 in the opposite case.Empirical evidence obtained from private sector studies
(Bamber, Bamber, & Schoderbeck, 1993; Maletta & Wright, 1996)
considers that there are reasons to assume that the sector in which
a company operates is a variable which can explain opinion type.
 – Spa
I
g
r
s
v
i
t
o
t
t
a
t
a
D
2
a
a
l
(
s
l
1
c
4
n
r
(
t
t
m
i
A
T
DB. González-Díaz et al. / Revista de Contabilidad
n the non-proﬁt sector it is argued that some organizations have
reater internal control and that the requirements for programmes
elated to certain types of subsidy or organization are stricter in
ome sectors than in others, which entail variations in quality. The
ariable sign is not predicted as previous studies where it has been
ncluded have used diverse classiﬁcations which are different from
hat proposed in this study (Keating et al., 2005).
State foundations may  be linked according to sectors by means
f their “Protectorate”, an umbrella organization whose aim is
o guarantee legal and foundation purpose compliance. The Pro-
ectorate provides support, initiatives and legal, ﬁnancial and
ccounting advice. It comes under the auspices of State Services
hrough different government departments whose responsibilities
re more directly related to the foundation purposes (González-
íaz et al., 2013).
The decision to make this a dummy  variable was  taken because
3.62 percent of the 254 selected foundations report to the Tax
nd Finance Department and the rest to other departments. Also,
 more detailed breakdown could cause statistical inference prob-
ems brought about by the smallness of a particular department
Sánchez & Sierra, 2001).
Finally, the year 2003 is included as a control variable (year)
ince this is when the Foundations Law, requiring the IGAE to audit
arge foundations, came into force. This variable takes the value of
 when the foundation was audited in 2003 and 0 in the opposite
ase.
.2.4. Model speciﬁcation
The use of the dependent audqual variable and a signiﬁcant
umber of dummy  independent and control variables has given
ise to logistic regression being used as the analysis methodology
Keasey et al., 1988) in which the regression coefﬁcients estimate
he impact of the independent variable on the probability that the
ype of opinion will be qualiﬁed. A positive sign for the coefﬁcient
eans that a variable increases the probability of a qualiﬁed opin-
on; a negative sign indicates the reverse.
The model can be expressed in this way:
UDQUAL = ˇ0 + ˇ1AUD TENURE + ˇ2AUDITOR + ˇ3SIZE
+ ˇ4PREV YEAR'S OPIN + ˇ5SURPLUS + ˇ6DEPARTMENT + ˇ7YEAR
A summary of all variables is included in Table 2.
able 2
escription of all variables.
audqual = 1, if the audit opinion is qualiﬁed; 0, otherwise
tenure = The number of consecutive years that the
foundation is audited by the same auditor
tenure ≤ 2 = 1 if the foundation is audited by the same
auditor for 2 consecutive years or less; 0, more
than 2 consecutive years
tenure ≤ 4 = 1 if the foundation is audited by the same
auditor for 4 consecutive years or less; 0, more
than 4 consecutive years
tenure ≥ 6 = 1 if the foundation is audited by the same
auditor for 6 or more consecutive years; 0, less
than 6 consecutive years
auditor = 1, if the foundation is audited privately; 0 if the
auditor is the IGAE
size = The natural log of total assets
surplus = 1, the foundation’s revenues do not exceed its
expenses; 0, otherwise
prev year's opin = 1, if the previous year’s opinion is qualiﬁed;
0,  otherwise
department = 1, if the foundation belongs to Tax and Finance
Minister; 0, otherwise
year = 1, if the foundation is audited in 2003;
0, otherwisenish Accounting Review 18 (2) (2015) 115–126 121
5. Results and analysis
In this section both univariate and multivariate results related
to tenure and auditor type are presented along with the remaining
control variables.
5.1. Descriptive and univariate analysis
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. The
tenure variable provides a mean value slightly higher than three
and a median of two for qualiﬁed reports and greater values,
for both the mean and the median in unqualiﬁed reports. The
descriptive statistics of the tenure variables, measured as a dummy
variable, show that the greater the time of the auditor–foundation
relationship, the lesser the likelihood of qualiﬁed reports.
Also, 18.97 percent of IGAE reports were qualiﬁed, whereas
the percentage drops to 15 percent when the auditors were
private.
In addition, Table 3 describes the remaining variables used
in the study. It can be seen that audit quality could in some
way be linked to the previous year’s opinion since 60 percent of
the foundations that got a qualiﬁed opinion had got the same
the previous year, as did 91.39 percent of those whose previ-
ous year’s opinion had been unqualiﬁed. Yet it does not appear
that revenue earnings greater than expenses affect quality given
that the percentage of qualiﬁed reports is very similar in the
case of both positive (17.76 percent) and negative (17.65 percent)
results.
As for foundations’ relationships with government depart-
ments, the descriptive data highlights the fact that those
organizations that receive fewer qualiﬁed reports are those under
the auspices of the departments of Education, Science and Inno-
vation (10.42 percent), Environment (8.33 percent), and Tax and
Finance (8.33 percent). At the opposite extreme are Justice (60 per-
cent), Health and Consumer Affairs (50 percent) and Public Works
(30.77 percent).
The descriptive statistics of the year variable shows that the per-
centage of qualiﬁed opinions decreases steadily from the beginning
of the period studied until the end given that 30.43 percent of foun-
dations received a qualiﬁed opinion in 2003 and only 9.3 percent
in 2010.
So as to determine possible relations between explanatory vari-
ables and opinion type, a univariate study was  carried out whereby
observations are divided into those with a qualiﬁed and those with
an unqualiﬁed opinion, the aim being to detect any major differ-
ences among them (Table 4).
The results of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test suggest that the
explanatory variables do not follow a normal pattern, except the
size one, which also shows homoscedasticity.
Therefore, the Student’s t-test was  applied to the size variable,
the non-parametric Mann–Whitney test to the variable tenure and
Pearson’s chi-square test to the dummies variables.
It can be seen that auditor tenure (tenure, tenure ≤ 2, tenure ≤ 4
and tenure ≥ 6) is different according to whether the reports were
clean or not. And also several control variables (prev year's opin
and department) behave differently according to opinion
type.
Lastly, Table 5 shows the correlation matrix between the differ-
ent variables. Only one of the correlation exceeds 0.40 (variables
size and auditor) suggesting that there are no multicollinearity
problems in the data (Vermeer et al., 2009).5.2. Multivariate analysis
Table 6 shows the results of the four estimated logistic regres-
sion models for the period 2003–2010, which differ only in the
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Qualiﬁed opinion (n = 45) Unqualiﬁed opinion (n = 209)
Mean Median Standard deviation Mean Median Standard deviation
tenure 3.089 2 2.141 4.770 5 2.686
size  6.926 6.833 .660 7.025 7.035 .652
Qualiﬁed opinion Unqualiﬁed opinion Total
n Percent n Percent n Percent
tenure ≤ 2
Three or more consecutive years 21 11.73 158 88.27 179 70.47
Two  or less consecutive years 24 32.00 51 68.00 75 29.53
tenure  ≤ 4
Five or more consecutive years 13 11.02 105 88.98 118 46.46
Four  or less consecutive years 32 23.53 104 76.47 136 53.54
tenure  ≥ 6
Five or less consecutive years 38 22.22 133 77.78 171 67.32
Six  or more consecutive years 7 8.43 76 91.57 83 32.68
auditor
IGAE  33 18.97 141 81.03 174 68.50
Private  auditor 12 15.00 68 85.00 80 31.50
surplus
Revenues exceed expenses 27 17.76 125 82.24 152 59.84
Revenues  do not exceed expenses 18 17.65 84 82.35 102 40.16
prev  year's opin
Unqualiﬁed opinion 18 8.61 191 91.39 209 82.28
Qualiﬁed  opinion 27 60.00 18 40.00 45 17.72
department
Foreign  affairs and cooperation 2 15.38 11 84.62 13 5.12
Culture  6 20.69 23 79.31 29 11.42
Tax  and ﬁnance 5 8.33 55 91.67 60 23.62
Education,  science and innovation 5 10.42 43 89.58 48 18.90
Public  works 8 30.77 18 69.23 26 10.24
Industry, tourism and commerce 3 11.11 24 88.89 27 10.63
Justice  3 60.00 2 40.00 5 1.97
The  environment 1 8.33 11 91.67 12 4.72
Health  and consumer affairs 8 50.00 8 50.00 16 6.30
Labour  and social services 4 22.22 14 77.78 18 7.09
year
2003  7 30.43 16 69.57 23 9.06
2004  7 24.14 22 75.86 29 11.42
2005  6 21.43 22 78.57 28 11.02
2006  7 21.21 26 78.79 33 12.99
2007  6 20.00 24 80.00 30 11.81
2008  5 15.63 27 84.38 32 12.60
2009  3 8.33 33 91.67 36 14.17
2010  4 9.30 39 90.70 43 16.93
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Table  4
Univariate analysis.
Variable Qualiﬁed opinion report mean
rank (sum of ranks)
Unqualiﬁed opinion report
mean rank (sum of ranks)
Mann–Whitney Test
(sig. bilateral)
tenure 88.19 (3968.50) 135.96 (28,416.50) 2933.50 (0.000*)
Variable Student’s t-test Sig. bilateral
size 0.926 0.355
Variable Pearson’s chi-square test Sig. bilateral
tenure ≤ 2 14.894 0.000*
tenure ≤ 4 6.785 0.009*
tenure ≥ 6 7.288 0.007*
auditor 0.591 0.442
prev year's opin 67.073 0.000*
surplus 0.001 0.981
department 4.745 0.029*
year 2.806 0.094
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table 5
Correlation matrix.
Variable tenure tenure ≤ 2 tenure ≤ 4 tenure ≥ 6 auditor size prev year's opin surplus department year
tenure 1
tenure ≤ 2 −.710** 1
tenure ≤ 4 −.826** .603** 1
tenure ≥ 6 .821** −.451** −.748** 1
auditor −.044 −.030 .037 −.129* 1
size .184** −.135* −.153* .182** −.489** 1
prev year's opin −.148* .152* .122 −.081 −.070 −.008 1
surplus .093 −.037 −.074 .097 .050 −.066 .020 1
department −.126* .026 .072 −.091 .122 −.128* −.112 .131* 1
year  −.148* .066 .046 −.220** .140* −.035 −.039 .021 .051 1
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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ays the variable aud tenure is deﬁned. The results are consis-
ent with those obtained in the univariate analysis, apart from the
ear variable, which is now statistically signiﬁcant.
The results provide evidence for the main variable of inter-
st for this study. Auditor tenure is signiﬁcant whether there
s a linear relation (tenure) or not (tenure ≤ 2; tenure ≤ 4;
enure ≥ 6) with the variable AUDQUAL. The results for model
 suggest that the longer the auditor tenure is, the lesser the
ikelihood of receiving a qualiﬁed report, and so the lower the
uality of the audit. Previously quoted studies (Deis & Giroux,
992; Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Vanstraelen, 2000) coincide
hen stating that long-term auditor–client relationships signiﬁ-
antly increase the likelihood of auditors issuing an unqualiﬁed
pinion.
Results obtained when dummy  variables are used (models 2–4)
o measure tenure indicate that this variable shows a positive sign
nd is statistically signiﬁcant for auditor–foundation relationships
f fewer than 5 years (models 2 and 3) and a negative, statisti-
ally signiﬁcant sign for relationships over 5 years (model 4). In
ther words, when the auditor has been auditing a foundation for
t least 6 years the likelihood of it getting a qualiﬁed report is
educed.
Overall, the empirical results for Spanish state-owned
oundations show that while audit quality decreases as tenure
ncreases, this quality loss does not become apparent until the sixth
ear of the auditor–client relationship as audit quality actually
ncreases over the ﬁrst ﬁve years.As far as the control variables are concerned, it should be pointed
out that the variable prev year's opin seems to play an important
part; the sign is positive and statistically variable and suggests that
foundations which have received a qualiﬁed report one year tend
to receive the same the following year.
The variable department shows a negative, statistically sig-
niﬁcant sign, suggesting that belonging to the Tax and Finance
Department reduces the likelihood of receiving a qualiﬁed report.
This result is in accordance with that of Keating et al. (2005) as
it shows that the sector a foundation belongs to, in this case its
departmental relationship, can affect audit report opinion.
The variable year’s sign is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for
2003. This demonstrates the repercussions of the change in Foun-
dation Law regulations which came into effect in 2003 and which
substantially modiﬁed the previous regulations concerning auditor
type and made auditing of large foundations compulsory. 2003 is
when a large number of foundations were audited for the ﬁrst time
by the IGAE instead of by private ﬁrms.
Finally, the study highlights the fact that the variables auditor,
size and surplus do not appear to inﬂuence audqual.
The robustness of the results was tested by using alternative
deﬁnitions for some variables. Speciﬁcally, the variable tenure was
substituted with the natural log of the number of consecutive years
the foundation has been audited by the same auditor; surplus is
deﬁned as continuous and size is deﬁned in three additional ways
– total assets in euros, revenues in euros and the natural log of
revenues. In each case the results do not change.
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Table  6
Logistic regression results.
Dependent variable: AUDQUAL (n = 254)
Model 1 Model 2
Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error Wald Statistic Signiﬁcance Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error Wald Statistic Signiﬁcance
tenure −.281 .097 8.456 .004***
tenure ≤ 2 1.105 .410 7.244 .007***
tenure ≤ 4
tenure ≥ 6
auditor −.535 .529 1.020 .312 −.528 .536 .973 .324
size  −.439 .369 1.416 .234 −.492 .370 1.773 .183
prev  year's op 2.775 .431 41.384 .000*** 2.791 .428 42.574 .000***
surplus .012 .427 .001 .977 −.068 .422 .026 .872
department −1.207 .601 4.024 .045** −1.172 .609 3.709 .054*
year 1.259 .587 4.603 .032** 1.421 .591 5.790 .016**
Constant 1.965 2.647 .551 .458 .838 2.698 .096 .756
Chi-squared test 74.940 72.480
Signiﬁcance .000 .000
Baseline rate 70.84% 70.84%
Improvement 20.55% 20.55%
Speciﬁcity 93.8% 94.3%
Sensitivity 46.7% 44.4%
Hosmer Test 85.4% 85.4%
Cox  and Snell R2 .255 .248
Nagelkerke R2 .421 .409
Model 3 Model 4
Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error Wald statistic Signiﬁcance Coefﬁcient estimate Standard error Wald statistic Signiﬁcance
tenure
tenure ≤ 2
tenure ≤ 4 .768 .426 3.249 .071*
tenure ≥ 6 −1.012 .515 3.865 .049**
auditor −.674 .529 1.622 .203 −.705 .525 1.801 .180
size  −.519 .362 2.055 .152 −.516 .362 2.031 .154
prev  year's op 2.789 .420 44.089 .000*** 2.828 .425 44.304 .000***
surplus −.015 .416 .001 .972 −.003 .418 .000 .995
department −1.137 .595 3.658 .056* −1.099 .588 3.499 .061*
year 1.487 .584 6.490 .011** 1.250 .600 4.350 .037**
Constant .991 2.661 .139 .709 1.714 2.611 .431 .512
Chi-squared test 68.560 69.424
Signiﬁcance .000 .000
Baseline rate 70.84% 70.84%
Improvement 21.68% 22.25%
Speciﬁcity 94.3% 94.7%
Sensitivity 48.9% 48.9%
Hosmer Test 86.2% 86.6%
Cox  and Snell R2 .237 .239
Nagelkerke R2 .390 .394
Notes: The model has a high explanatory power, with a highly signiﬁcant chi-squared test. Another way  to assess the performance of the maximum likelihood model is to
measure the percentage of correct observations and compare it to the classiﬁcation rate that would be obtained by chance [the baseline rate, which is equal to a2 + (1 − a)2,
where  a is the proportion of audit reports which have received a qualiﬁed opinion (17.72%) in the sample]. This model predicts the likelihood of getting a qualiﬁed opinion
better  than a random model would, with a classiﬁcation improvement that ranges from 20.55 percent to 22.25 percent, which is close to the improvement of 25 percent
suggested by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1995).
The speciﬁcity (its capacity to correctly predict reports with an unqualiﬁed opinion) of the model is very good to excellent, while its sensitivity (its capacity to correctly
predict  reports with a qualiﬁed opinion) is good. At the same time, the global capacity to correctly classify the cases, measured using the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test, ranges
from  85.4 percent to 86.6 percent. Pseudo R2 measures (Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke) conﬁrm that the model has very good explanatory power.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
. Summary and conclusions
The study examines the auditor tenure relationship with audit
uality, the latter being considered from the point of view of exter-
al users.
Using a sample of 254 audits carried out on Spanish state-owned
oundations between 2003 and 2010, the results reveal that such a
onnection does exist. In other words, it shows that a long relation-
hip between a foundation and its auditor increases the likelihood
f the auditor issuing a clean report. Auditor performance is,
owever, different in the ﬁrst few years as the probability of aqualiﬁed report increases. In other words, audit quality, measured
as the likelihood that an auditor will submit a qualiﬁed opinion,
increases over the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the relationship and then
decreases.
Multivariate analysis results are consistent with univariate ones
and may  be regarded as generally robust to alternative speciﬁca-
tions and sensitivity analysis.The study contributes to the literature on the relationship
between auditor tenure and audit quality in an environment where
there is no mandatory auditor rotation and in a sector, non-proﬁt
making, where empirical research is very limited.
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The results from this research also contribute to literature on
actors which affect audit quality as they suggest that the opinion
rom the previous year’s report, sector and year are all factors which
lay a major part in audit quality.
These ﬁndings also provide useful evidence to regulators, leg-
slators, and ﬁnancial statement users given that it suggests the
eed for the introduction of tenure-reducing measures which, at
he same time, also ensure a minimum tenure period.
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